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ABSTRACT
A Completely Covert Audio Channel in Android
by Sukanya Thakur
Exfilteration of private data is a potential security threat against mobile devices.
Previous research concerning such threats has generally focused on techniques that
are only valid over short distances (NFC, Bluetooth, electromagnetic emanations,
and so on). In this research, we develop and analyze an exfilteration attack that has
no distance limitation. Specifically, we take advantage of vulnerabilities in Android
that enable us to covertly record and exfilterate a voice call. This paper presents
a successful implementation of our attack, which records a call (both uplink and
downlink voice streams), and inaudibly transmits the recorded voice over a subsequent
inaudible call, without any visual or audio indication given to the victim. We provide
a detailed analysis of our attack, and we suggest possible counter measures to thwart
similar attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Exfiltration of private data is a threat on mobile devices. Published attacks to
exfiltrate data from mobile devices use various communication channels such as NFC,
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and FM radio receivers found in those devices [4, 8]. Availability
of these media on mobile devices also provide opportunities for using them as re-
ceivers for data exfilteration from other non-mobile devices such as a computer using
electromagnetic emanations [11]. While these media are commonly found in mobile
devices, relying on such media results in attacks for which distance from the target is
a limiting factor. This limitation, however, is absent when the cellular network itself
is used for exfiltration. The cellular network can be vulnerable to attacks due to the
fact that in most mobile phones the cellular interface (also known as baseband) is
controlled by the main processor of the mobile device, a feature that leaves cellular
media vulnerable to attack [10, 14]. Some published work explores the possibility of
using a text channel provided by the cellular network as a medium for exfiltration [5].
While the texting over a cellular network does provide a viable option for removing
any distance limitation, it suffers from the limitation that a data plan must be pur-
chased for the mobile device, and text usage appears in the phone bill, which likely
makes such an attack transient, at best.
In this project we have demonstrated that the audio media during a voice call
can become a medium for exfiltration. There are several potential advantages in using
audio during a voice call for exfiltration. As discussed above, voice does not have any
distance limitation, and such usage is less likely to be observed on a bill. The main
problem in using the audio media is that the voice calls are visually indicated and
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the audio transaction is audible.
We demonstrate that a voice call can be made completely covert—soundless
and with no visual cue to the phone user. We demonstrate our implementation of
covertly recording a call, and soundless replay of audio data to an incoming call
and automatically connecting the exfiltration call without any visual indication. The
implementation also demonstrates that incoming calls can be independently selected
for either covert call recording or covert replay of audio data that includes recorded
calls and other audio files, such as music. Soundlessness and the absence of visual
cues together render a completely covert channel for exfiltration of a voice call.
In this paper we demonstrate covert exfiltration of two types of audio data—a
recorded call conversation and a music file. There is published work [1, 8, 5] showing
an ongoing trend of modulating data and video for exfiltration. Based on this trend,
we believe that our work can easily be extended to exfiltrate data and video.
Our implementation of covert audio media during a voice call makes use of known
vulnerabilities in Android, such as device rooting, easily exportable hidden APIs,
installation of modules as shared libraries, and allowing an application to run inside
the process of another application. Our purpose is to demonstrate the exploitation
of these vulnerabilities so as to encourage the development of countermeasures to
mitigate these potential security threats.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the essential background
information needed to understand our implementation. In Chapter 2, we give an
overview of related work published in this field, and we discuss how our work contrasts
with or builds upon the key ideas presented in previous work. Chapter 3 discusses our
implementation in detail. Chapter 4 describes experiments that we have conducted
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to verify the claimed covertness of the implementation. Countermeasures to thwart
the risk of attacks shown in our work are discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we
summarize our work and discuss a set of enhancements that could expose a much
greater level of threat using the covertness of audio media during a voice call.
3
CHAPTER 2
Background
This chapter discusses necessary background of Android in order to understand
the implementation approach and the outcome of this project. We will also discuss
here briefly the prior work done in this area and how our work contrasts with or
builds on the key ideas presented in those works. Android has a reference architec-
ture simplified and illustrated by Table 1. The reference architecture is a layered
architecture—the lower layers providing services to the upper layers. Android ap-
plications use the Java Application Programming Interfaces (API) exported from
the Java/Framework layer. Framework layer API realize their functionality by using
the services provided by the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) components im-
plemented in C/C++. Java API use Java Native Interface (JNI) to transact with
the HAL API. Android Open Source Project (AOSP) provides the source code and
build tools for Framework/Java API, JNI and HAL API for any published version of
Android [2]. The HAL API interact with the linux kernel through software drivers
provided mostly by device vendors. The lowest layer consists of various hardware
such as audio devices, Baseband, and GPS. Baseband device interfaces with the Cel-
lular network and naturally is one of the main hardware components in the mobile
devices. Android functional modules such as Telephony and Audio modules conform
to the Android reference architecture. Refer to the published Android Reference [13]
for a detailed understanding of the Telephony stack. Refer to Android Audio Imple-
mentation site [3] for a detailed understanding of the Audio stack. Section 2.1 and
Section 2.2 present the essential elements of the Telephony and the Audio stacks re-
spectively. The material presented in these sections provide the necessary background
4
for our implementation presented in Chapter 3.
Table 1: Android Telephony and Audio stacks
Android Ref
Stack
Telephony Audio
Apps Phone Media player
Java
API/Frame-
work
PhoneGlobal, Call-
Manager, Call Noti-
fier, GSMPhone, RIL,
ITelephony
AudioRecorder, Au-
dioTrack
JNI libmedia_runtime
HAL RIL daemon(rild) libmedia, tinyalsa,
AudioFlinger, Au-
dioMixer
Linux Kernel vendor RIL ALSA
Hardware Baseband Processor Mic, Speaker, Blue-
tooth, earphone
2.1 Telephony Stack
The Telephony stack implements the control path of a voice call whereas, the
voice path is implemented in the Audio stack. The purpose of the control path is to
process the signals from the underlying baseband device as well as from the phone user
and manage the life cycle of a voice call. The main components of our interest in this
stack are the Radio Interface Layer(RIL), BasePhone, CallManager, and CallNotifier.
Each of these components are class objects. RIL interfaces with the RIL daemon in
the HAL via a linux socket for receiving or sending call signals to the underlying soft-
ware device driver (aka vendor RIL) that controls the baseband device. Drake et al.
explains RIL and its related components details [6]. An internal PhoneApp applica-
tion configures the Telephony stack by interconnecting the components to each other
so that they form a layered hierarchy. The upper layer component registers with the
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lower layer to get notifications for certain events. The lower layer notifies its regis-
tered upper layer components when the event occurs. RIL, BasePhone, CallManager
and CallNotifier form a stack sequence, RIL being at the lowest. BasePhone holds the
reference to the underlying implementation of a phone object such as GSMPhone or
CDMAPhone. BasePhone in turn is referenced by the ProxyPhone object. BasePhone
registers itself with RIL object to receive and send the call control signals. CallMan-
ager registers with the BasePhone for almost all telephony events and gets notified
by the BasePhone. The CallNotifier implements the call indication User Interface
(UI) for incoming calls. CallNotifier shows the call indications when CallManager
notifies it on an incoming call. These components form a path sequence for upward
flow of a call signal. For example, an incoming call signal in the Java layer can travel
through a path—RIL ->BasePhone ->CallManager ->CallNotifier. Figure 1 il-
lustrates this arrangement and shows the register-notify hierarchy of the components
discussed above.
Figure 1: Main Modules of Telephony Stack
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2.2 Audio Stack
The Audio stack manages the audio hardware devices such as speaker, earpiece,
voice call device, bluetooth, headset, earphone and so on. The stack provides device
control such as discovery of a device, enabling a device, and muting a device. In
addition to controlling and managing the individual audio devices, one of the main
functionality of the Audio stack is to manage and control the audio paths. Figure 2
shows the main components of Audio stack during a voice call. An audio path from
any of the physical audio devices is called an audio channel. The digital audio data
flowing through a channel is referred to as an audio stream. The voice channel and
the voice stream refer to the audio channel and the audio stream during a voice call.
Figure 2: Main Modules of Audio Stack
In this discussion we are interested in the management of the voice streams and
the voice channels during a voice call. A voice stream during a call is coded in Pulse
Code Modulation (PCM) using 16 bits for each sample. The Voice Call device refers
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to a virtual device that provides and handles the voice channels and the voice streams
during a voice call all the way to the Baseband via the HAL interface. The Audio stack
uses tinyalsa as the HAL layer to control, read and write voice data during a call. The
tinyalsa HAL layer provides API to read and write PCM data streams. These PCM
streams are routed and mixed by AudioFlinger and AudioMixer to other devices. A
voice path during a voice call consists of two channels - uplink and downlink. The
uplink voice channel takes the voice stream from input devices such as microphone
or bluetooth to the baseband. The downlink channel carries the voice streams from
the baseband to the output devices such as speaker, earpiece, earphone or bluetooth.
One of the main functionality of the Audio stack, as mentioned above, is to
provide pathways to audio streams by switching them among multiple channels. In
addition to switch the streams among multiple channels, the stack provides also a
mixer for re-sampling and mixing the audio streams to improve the audio quality and
to feed the streams appropriately to channels. For example, both uplink and downlink
voice streams are mixed and fed to the speaker. The switching and mixing of audio
streams are controlled by a policy manager. The policy manager runs as a system
service and is implemented by AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp module in the HAL. The
switch and the mixer are implemented by AudioFlinger and AudioMixer modules re-
spectively in the HAL. The policy manager defines and creates the pathways. The
policy manager uses an external configuration file, “audio_policy.conf”, located in the
/etc/ directory. The policy configuration file is a plain text file. It defines the input
and output audio devices and their profiles. A profile define the device characteristics
used by the mixer and flinger. For example, the profile for a voice call device defines
number of bits per sample, sampling rate, number of channels to be mixed and so
on. AudioPolicyManagerBase reads the configuration information at the boot time
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and creates internal data structure for the AudioFlinger. If the external audio policy
configuration file is not present, the policy manager creates a default configuration
for each device. The audio policy manager creates a data structure that represents
the configuration information and used by the flinger and mixer modules. The flinger
switches the streams among the defined pathways based on the configuration infor-
mation. Prior to switching the streams to a channel, the flinger sends the stream to
the mixer with appropriate mixing parameters. The output of the mixer is fed to the
destination channel.
The Audio stack publishes AudioRecord and AudioTrack API to applications for
reading or writing the audio streams to user files. AudioRecord outputs a specified
stream for writing to an external file. AudioTrack takes a user stream and feeds it to
an audio output device via the flinger. AudioRecord and AudioTrack are discussed
in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 respectively.
2.3 Audio Recording
AudioRecord is used for audio recording. The API returns audio stream from
a user requested audio input device. The API takes the audio input device as the
audio source parameter. AudioRecord.java implements the user interface of the API
and AudioRecord.cpp implements the main functionality. In the user interface layer,
the user provided parameters are validated and a call to JNI is made. The JNI part
creates the AudioRecord.cpp object, and invokes the set method of this object. The
set method in turn makes a call to the flinger to open an output channel that can
be used to provide an outlet for the stream requested by the user. The flinger reads
the device information and its profile from the configuration data created by the
policy manager to validate the user request. At this point the user request for the
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stream output can be declined depending on the policy defined by the configuration
information. Once the request is validated and accepted, the AudioRecord object sets
up buffers that are shared between the user thread and the flinger. So the flinger will
output the requested stream in the shared buffer. The user is expected to consume
the stream data from the buffer to prevent any overrun. AudioRecord provides a
read method to extract stream data from the buffer. After every read, the buffer is
released.
Android official site mentions the voice call device as one of the possible input
devices that can be accepted by the API. However, starting Android 4.0, the voice
call device implies only the uplink voice channel from the microphone. The downlink
voice channel is simply ignored by the API. This prevents recording of a two-way call
conversation.
2.4 Audio Replay
AudioTrack is used by applications for writing user audio stream into an audio
output device such as speaker and bluetooth. AudioTrack.java implements the user
interface and AudioTrack.cpp implements the main functionality. A JNI interface
provides the transition and data transfer between the two modules. Figure 3 shows
how this API interfaces with the HAL layer. The user interface transfers control to
JNI after a preliminary validation of user arguments. The JNI creates the Audio-
Track.cpp object and calls its set method. The set method in turn makes a call to
the flinger for opening an input channel that can provide the user stream a path to
the requested device for output. The flinger validates the user request using the con-
figuration information created by the policy manager. An input channel is opened or
declined depending on the configuration information. The implementation does not
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support a user stream to feed a voice call directly as there is no standalone voice call
device configuration available for direct output. In addition to this, the flinger and
mixer are configured in such a way that the user audio stream is never routed to a
voice call. The configuration allows the downstream voice channel to be connected
to only audible devices such as speaker, headphone, earpiece or bluetooth. The up-
stream voice channel is fed from only microphone or bluetooth. Any alteration to
this scheme would require a major code change in flinger. The above implementation
of AudioTrack API makes it considerably difficult to make a voice call inaudible.
Figure 3: AudioTrack implementation at the lower layer
2.5 Prior Work on Covert Channel using Audio Media
Multiple works have been published demonstrating proof of concepts on imple-
menting covert audio channels in Android for data exfilteration. These works fall
under two main categories—a) Modulating the data and transmitting it in the in-
audible frequency range through an audio media; and b) Modulating the data and
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transmitting it in the audible range using voice path. While transmitting data in
inaudible range requires the adversary mobile device to be located in close proximity
to the compromised device, data transmitted in the audible range is essentially not
covert.
The work of Do et al. [5] presents use of SMS and audio media for covertly
exfiltrating data from a mobile device. Do et al. argue that SMS and audio media
are commonly available media on mobile devices and exfiltration over these media
is difficult to be controlled. The authors propose the SMS medium for long range,
large data exfiltration; and the audio medium for short range, small data exfiltration.
Base64 is used to convert data to text prior to sending it via SMS. The entire base64
encoded data is split into a series of SMS messages prior to transmission. As messages
via SMS are not guaranteed to be delivered in sequence, the receiver uses message
index inserted by the sender to reassemble the messages in order. The messages are
deleted immediately after sending in order to avoid detection at the victim phone.
Scheme proposed by Do et al. for using audio medium for exfiltration relies on the
fact that speakers and microphones on mobile devices can generate and received audio
frequencies outside the human audible range. The work shows inaudible broadcast of
user key-press sequences from the victim phone speaker and subsequent reception of
the inaudible broadcast by the adversary microphone. The key press on the victim
phone is tapped and the sequence of 1 and 0 of the key code is converted to inaudible
frequency range to be broadcast from the speaker. 20 kHz, 22 kHz and 21 kHz are used
respectively to represent 0, 1 and space between any two data bits. The sequence
101 is sent without any spacer frequency to indicate completion of the binary bit
pattern for a key-press. Both the schemes presented by Do et al. suffer from serious
limitations inherent in the chosen media of exfiltration. Use of SMS can face limited
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availability of media and can run into risk of detection. Availability of SMS depends
on the service plan of the mobile phone, and can be detected by the usage record
in the phone bill. The user can be visibly warned and/or further transmission can
be blocked when the size of exfiltration exceeds the permissible data capacity of the
phone by the service plan. These incidences can expose the attack. The audio scheme
proposed by the authors suffers from distance limitation and data transmission errors
due to noise present in the medium. The authors found that the reception accuracy
was 100% only up to 1.7 m and the reception dropped entirely by 3.7 m. No data has
been presented by the authors to clearly show the impact of noise on transmission
errors, however they observed that in the cafe environment, reception dropped entirely
at 2.9 m.
Work by Guri et al. [8] presents covert data exfitration from a computer with
the help of a mobile phone using audio media. The data (text or binary) from
the computer is first modulated to audio tones using either Audio Frequency Shift
Keying (A-FSK) or Dual Tone Multiple-Frequency (DTMF). The audio signal is then
frequency modulated using a carrier frequency in the FM radio range. The carrier
frequency in FM radio range is generated by the video display unit by constructing
an image of alternating sequence of black and white pixels. Once emanated from the
video display unit, the signal is like a FM radio broadcast that is received by FM
Radio in mobile phone. This FM audio is recorded by the mobile phone by modifying
the MediaRecorder class, to extract and demodulate the data. In order to avoid
potential detection by reception of changing tones in the FM radio in the mobile
phone, the FM reception band is changed. Guri et al. work by using audio media
for covert exfiltration suffers from distance limitation. Their results show that data
could be transmitted with 97.73% accuracy up to a maximum distance of only 7 m.
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Audio/FM modulated data transmission is slow, the results showing approximately
11 hours to transfer a raw data of size 0.5MB.
The work of Aloraini [1] attempts to use voice call as a covert media for trans-
mitting audio modulated text data. In this work, a call monitor is inserted within the
telephony stack to watch for an incoming call from a predetermined number. Upon
receiving a call from that number, the call is connected without any visual indication.
The text data is converted to audio using FSK modulation prior to transmission.
The transmission of data however, remains audible. Moreover, the phone user cannot
make any call during the exfiltration. The work justifies the covertness by arguing
that the modulated signal sound is not human intelligible. The audibility and the user
call blocking scheme however, makes the attack detectable, and the overall scheme of
exfiltration fails to remain covert. In addition, the work is not suitable for large data
exfiltration as the phone will remain blocked during the entire duration of exfiltration.
The scheme is also not suitable for exfiltration of voice data, for example, a recorded
call or music as it will become intelligibly audible.
Our work demonstrates a completely covert voice path that is inaudible with no
visual indication. We have also provided a way to record any call conversation by
breaking the limitation of AudioRecord to record only uplink voice. We also handle
the call states within the call monitor to avoid blocking of user initiated calls during
the exfiltration. In this project we have implemented and shown only audio data
exfiltration. This is only a superficial limitation and can be removed by deploying
the published work to convert non-audio data to audio data.
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2.6 Infection Mechanism
With all its attempts to providing security to application and data, Android re-
mains vulnerable because of its architectural limitations and practices. As Drake and
Elenkov show in their respective [6, 7] A complete treatise on Android vulnerabilities
are available in the separately published works of Drake et al. and Elenkov [6, 7].
We highlight some of those here as examples. Android uses shared libraries to im-
plement API at the HAL layer and uses dex jar files for implementing API at the
application layer. By knowing the Android version of a phone (which can be easily
automated by yet another malicious software implanted in the device), it is easy to
build a shared library or the dex jar files for that version in the AOSP and transport
it to the device once the device is rooted. Rooting a device is routinely done by the
adversaries. Another vulnerability of Android lies in the fact that an application can
potentially run in the process of another application and can enjoy the privileges of
the host application. The only real prevention provided by Android here is that the
incumbent application should be signed with the same certificate as the host applica-
tion. There are multiple ways of overcoming this restriction including use of publicly
available signing tools. Another easily vulnerable security mechanism used by An-
droid is to hide an API by using @hide pragma of Java and creating a rule in the
ADT plugin used by SDK. This security arrangement is easily breakable with tools
like d2j_dex2jar that can easily extract the Java jar files from dex code and include
those in the SDK. A simple hack in ADT can easily be done, as shown in Appendix
A to work around the ADT rule. After including the extracted jar files from dex
jar files and removing the ADT rule, all the hidden API can be accessed using Java
reflection. Java reflection allows access to even private fields and methods. Finally,
it remains a fact that all security mechanisms implemented by Android ends at the
15
Java layer. Access to the HAL layer when a device is rooted, bypasses all the Android
specific security layers. Once the device is rooted, the HAL layer opens up a wide
attack surface. Modifying the HAL layer open source or using the needed API from
this layer is easy. Our work demonstrates the exploitation of all the above Android
vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation
This chapter describes the implementation of our project. There are essentially
three parts to our implementation. Section 3.2 discusses the first part of implementa-
tion for covertly watching for incoming phone numbers. This part of implementation
is also responsible for triggering the covert recording of a call, and automatically
connecting to an incoming call for covert audio exfiltration.
The second part implements a covert recording of an incoming call from a prede-
termined number. As discussed in the Section 2.3, Android does not allow recording
of a two-way call conversation during a voice call. Only the uplink voice stream can
be recorded. Section 3.4 discusses our implementation to remove this restriction.
The final part of our implementation deals with inaudible exfiltration or replay
of an audio stream directly into a voice call. As discussed in Section 2.4, this feature
is simply not available in Android. A major code change is required to overcome this
limitation. Section 3.3 discusses our much simplified implementation for injecting any
audio data covertly into a voice call.
Before delving into details, we would like to mention that learning Android pro-
gramming environment and methodology is an essential skill to be acquired for the
implementation. The Android programming concepts and examples illustrated in [12]
have been extremely useful during our implementation.
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3.1 The Development Environment
All Android applications and libraries are compiled and built on a host system
using the cross compilation and build tootkits for the target mobile device. Hence
a development environment is to be set up for cross-compiling and building the ap-
plication and the libraries. Our host system consists of Ubuntu 14.04LTS running
on Windows 7 based VMPlayer. We used Eclipse Luna with Android Development
Tool (ADT) plugin. Eclipse provides an Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
for developing Android applications. Both the Android SDK and the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) source tree are installed on the host. SDK and ADT plugin
together provide the API, the toolkit and the build rules for Android application
development. AOSP comes with the required toolkit for building the shared libraries
and dex modules such as framework.jar. Refer to Android sites for downloading and
configuring AOSP, ADT and SDK [2, 9]. In addition to the standard tools mentioned
above, other tools are also needed to support our special needs of rooting the device,
signing the application and extracting dex files. Table 2 lists the tools and devices
used for the implementation.
Rooting of the target phone device is critical for our implementation. We could
use the rooting process fully explained in [4]. We chose to build and download the
Android on the target device in the debug mode, giving us automatic root access [6].
In order to use certain hidden API, the SDK needed to be extended with the class
files of certain core classes in framework and telephony modules. This was achieved
by extracting the required jar files from the dex modules in the target device using the
d2j_dex2jar tool. Eclipse needed to be configured for setting up SDK path, building
system application and enabling access to hidden API. Android ADT plugin in Eclipse
needs some hacking for permitting use of hidden API. Appendix A gives the steps
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Table 2: Development Tools & Devices
Tools & Devices Development Usage
Ubuntu 14.04LTS Operating system on the host
VM
Eclipse Luna IDE for building application
ADT Android plugin for Eclipse
SDK Development kit
AOSP 4.3 Building shared library
WugFresh Nexus Root Toolkit
v1.8.2
Rooting the target device
d2j_dex2jar 2.0 Extract the java jar file from
dex files
signApk Signing the application
Android Phone firmware Maguro 4.3
JWR66Y
Experimental target phone de-
vice
for setting up Eclipse including the hack for working around the ADT plugin rules.
Appendix B gives the steps to carry out for building libraries in the AOSP, creating
the required entries in the application Manifest file and signing the application.
3.2 Implanting a Call Monitor
The call monitor application needs to share the process of PhoneApp so that it
can register for receiving call notifications. The call monitor is implemented as an
Android Service application and is inserted inside the PhoneApp process representing
a Man-in-Middle attack. The approach is similar to the work of Aloraini [1]. We,
however, handle the call states in the call monitor as opposed to simply blocking the
handlers. This makes the call tapping fully covert by avoiding any potential notice
taken by the phone user.
In order to share the PhoneApp process, the application has to have the same
user id and certificate as the PhoneApp. As the PhoneApp is installed as a system
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application, our application is installed under /system/app. Appendix A shows the
entries in the Manifest.xml file of the application and describes the steps to sign the
application.
In order to insert our call monitor between the BasePhone and the CallManager,
the references to the BasePhone, the CallManager and their corresponding call han-
dlers are obtained using Java reflection mechanism. CallManager has a single handler
that is used to handle all the call related notifications. The call monitor application
registers itself with the BasePhone and de-registers the CallManager handler from the
BasePhone. The application then registers the CallManager handler to itself. This
process inserts the application between the BasePhone and the CallManager making
it receive the call notifications prior to the CallManager.Figure 4 illustrates how the
call monitor is positioned within the Telephony stack.
Figure 4: Placing Call Monitor inside the telephony stack
Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows essential code snippets for placing the call
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Phone phone = nu l l ;
t ry {
phone = (Phone ) m. invoke ( c ) ;
Log . i ( "Sukanya" , "Phone␣Found" ) ;
} catch ( I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion e ) {
//TODO Auto−generated catch block
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lAc c e s sExc ep t i on e ) {
//TODO Auto−generated catch block
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Invocat ionTargetExcept ion e ) {
//TODO Auto−generated catch block
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
Phone basePhone = phone . getForegroundCal l ( ) . getPhone ( ) ;
Figure 5: Get the reference to the Phone using Reflection
monitor between the BasePhone and the CallManager.
t ry {
myHandler = ( Handler )mCMHandler . get (mCM) ;
Log . i ( "Sukanya" , "CallManager␣Handler ␣ found" ) ;
} catch ( I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lAc c e s sExc ep t i on e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
basePhone . unreg i sterForIncomingRing (myHandler ) ;
t h i s . r eg i s te rForIncomingRing (myHandler , EVENT_INCOMING_RING, nu l l ) ;
Figure 6: Unregister the CallManager from Phone
basePhone . reg isterForNewRingingConnect ion (mHandler ,
EVENT_NEW_RINGING_CONNECTION, nu l l ) ;
basePhone . reg i s te rForIncomingRing (mHandler , EVENT_INCOMING_RING, nu l l ) ;
Figure 7: Register the call monitor handler with the Phone
The call monitor is responsible for monitoring incoming calls and suppressing
any visual indication when an audio replay is to be done. In our implementation we
hard coded a phone number for secretly recording the call, and another number for
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replaying the recorded call. When the call monitor detects the incoming call from the
recording number, it starts the recording by using the modified AudioRecord API.
The incoming call notifications are also passed to the CallManager so that the call
appears to be a normal call. Current implementation has a hard coded file name
to store the recording. When the incoming call from the replay number is detected,
the call monitor automatically connects the call and suppresses the incoming call
notification from sending it to the CallManager. Hence the CallNotifier is never
invoked to give any visual indication. The call monitor starts the replay by calling
the MyAudioTrack. The MyAudioTrack API uses tinyalsa API for sending the audio
stream directly into the voice call. Implementation of MyAudioTrack is explained in
Section 3.3.
3.3 Implementing Soundles Replay of Audio Data
The flinger replays all audio files by feeding the stream into output device such as
Speaker. A voice call streams are fed to the standard input and output devices. The
flinger is coded in such a way that it would require considerable re-design and coding
to disassociate the connections of a voice call streams from the channels of the audio
devices. However our research has identified a shortcut path to directly feed the audio
file stream into a voice call uplink stream. The mechanism uses the fact that with
root permission, it is possible to read/write the PCM streams by making direct calls
to tinyalsa API. This mechanism bypasses the flinger making the replay completely
soundless. We have implemented a user level API, MyAudioTrack that interfaces
with tinyalsa using the standard JNI and C++ object. This approach enables access
to tinyalsa from user application level. Figure 8 illustrates the mechanism explained
above.
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Figure 8: Modified AudioTrack uses direct call to tinyalsa
The user interface of MyAudioTrack is integrated with the framework.jar. The
JNI for this API is created and integrated in libandroid_runtime.so and MyAudio-
Track.cpp is created and integrated in the libmedia.so. MyAudioTrack provides a
play method to play the audio to the voice call. The play method implemented in
the C++ end of MyAudioTrack uses the tinyalsa APIs to write to baseband device
directly.
Figure 9 gives a pseudo code used to insert the PCM data of a file directly into
the baseband device.
pcmdev = open_pcm( card , dev i c e )
f i l e = open_f i l e ( f i l ename )
do :
nbytes = f r ead ( f i l e , bu f f e r , BUFSIZE)
pcm_write (pcmdev , bu f f e r , nbytes )
whi l e nbytes > 0
Figure 9: Writing the data directly into the pcm stream
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3.4 Recording a voice call
The existing audio policy implemented by Android restricts the voice recording
stream only to be fed from the microphone input stream. This implies that only
uplink voice during a call can be recorded as it is sourced from the microphone.
Recording of both the uplink and the downlink streams of a voice call is prevented by
excluding the voice call device from the list of input devices in the audio configuration
file; and by dropping the channel entries for a voice call from the list of channels in
sInChannelsNameToEnumTable array.
First we need to make the necessary entries in the “audio_policy.conf”
file. To enable the recording of a voice call, the voice call device symbol,
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_VOICE_CALL, and its profile data were added to the policy con-
figuration file. The required voice channels were entered in the sInChannelsName-
ToEnumTable array in the AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp file. In addition, the hidden
audioParamCheck method of AudioRecord class was made aware of the uplink and
downlink voice channels. Figure 10 shows the entry for the voice call device. Fig-
ure 11 shows profile entry. Both entries are added to the audio policy configuration
file.
g l oba l_con f i gu ra t i on {
attached_output_devices AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_EARPIECE |
AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER
default_output_device AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER
attached_input_devices AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BUILTIN_MIC |
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BACK_MIC | AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_VOICE_CALL
}
Figure 10: Adding voice call device to the audio policy file
Next, we need to make changes in the AudioRecord and AudioPolicyManager-
Base.cpp files. Figure 12 gives the code snippet for adding the voice call channels to
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i nputs {
primary {
sampling_rates 8000 |11025 |16000 |22050 |24000 |32000 |44100 |48000
channel_masks AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_MONO |AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_STEREO |
AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_FRONT_BACK | AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_CALL
formats AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT dev i c e s AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BUILTIN_MIC
|AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLUETOOTH_SCO_HEADSET |
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_WIRED_HEADSET | AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BACK_MIC |
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_VOICE_CALL
}
}
Figure 11: Adding voice call device profile to the audio policy file
the audioParamCheck method of the user interface part of AudioRecord API. This
modification is needed to make AudioRecord recognize these channels. Figure 13
shows insertion of the voice call channels in the sInChannelsNameToEnumTable list.
This addition is needed for the flinger to recognize these channels. Finally Figure 14
illustrates how the AudioRecord API can be called for recording a voice call.
case (AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK | AudioFormat .
CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_DNLINK) :
mChannelCount = 2 ;
mChannels = channelConf ig ;
break ;
case AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_DNLINK:
mChannelCount = 1 ;
mChannels = channelConf ig ;
break ;
case AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK:
mChannelCount = 1 ;
mChannels = channelConf ig ;
break ;
Figure 12: Adding voice call channels as acceptable parameter value to AudioRecord
API
3.5 Installation
After making the code changes as described in the previous sections, the modules
are compiled, built and downloaded to the device. Refer to Appendix B for these
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#de f i n e AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_CALL
(AudioSystem : :CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK)
const s t r u c t StringToEnum sInChannelsNameToEnumTable [ ] = {
STRING_TO_ENUM(AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_MONO) ,
STRING_TO_ENUM(AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_STEREO) ,
STRING_TO_ENUM(AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_FRONT_BACK) ,
STRING_TO_ENUM(AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_CALL) ,
} ;
Figure 13: Adding voice call streams to flinger
record = new AudioRecord (MediaRecorder . AudioSource .VOICE_CALL,
SAMPLE_RATE,
AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK |
AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_DNLINK,
// AudioFormat .CHANNEL_IN_STEREO,
AudioFormat .ENCODING_PCM_16BIT, bu fS i z e ) ;
Figure 14: Calling Audio Record for recording for recording voice call
steps. Table 3 shows the modules that are built and their destination locations in the
target phone device.
Table 3: Modules and their install destinations
New or Modified item Destination
MyAudioTrack framework/framework.jar
MyAudioTrack lib/libmedia.so
android_media_MyAudioTrack.cpp lib/libandroid_runtime.so
AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp lib/hw/audio_policy.default.so
final.apk /system/app
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CHAPTER 4
Results
We conducted a series of experiments and results to verify the audio and vi-
sual covertness of the audio data exfiltration. The experiment to covertly recording a
two-way call coversation during a voice call is described in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 de-
scribes the exfiltration of a pre-recorded call, and Section 4.3 describes the exfiltration
of a music file.
A series of experiments need to be conducted to show the behavior of victim
phone in presence of the attack. For example the impact on battery life and the
timing delay experienced during a normal call are to be observed and recorded here.
Section 4.4 is currently a place holder for these experiments.
4.1 Experiment 1: Recording a Call conversation
This experiment verifies the recording of both uplink and downlink voice streams.
Figure 15(a) illustrates this experiment.
When a call comes from a pre-determined number, the recording starts and stored
under a file in the root directory. The file is then pulled to the host and replayed
using ’aplay’ available on Ubuntu 14.04LTS using the following command line:
aplay -t raw -c 2 -f S16_LE -r 44100 record.pcm
We found that the replay is clear for both streams. However the volume of
downlink voice is much lower compared to the uplink voice.
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Figure 15: Experimental setup for showing covert call recording and replay
4.2 Experiment 2: Replaying covertly the recorded call to an incoming
number
The second part of the experiment illustrated by Figure 15(b) was done to verify
covert replay of the recorded audio file in the experiment in 4.1. The expectation was
that when a call comes from a predetermined number, the call would be connected
without showing any visual indication and the audio file will be replayed to the other
end of the call without being heard at the local device. We verified this expected
outcome.
The audibility of uplink voice was clear, but the downlink voice was a little
difficult to hear. This can be due to the fact that we used only default static mixer
when replaying the audio file to the voice call device.
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4.3 Experiment 3: Replaying a large music file to a pre-determined in-
coming number
This experiment is similar to the experiment in 4.2, but this time a large WAV
file was used for replay. The file played for around 4 minutes with clear audibility to
the other end.
4.4 Experiment 4: Impact on normal phone behavior
We experimented the behavior of the phone for the following use cases to verify
the covertness of the replay:
1. An incoming call to the victim phone during an exfiltration: The exfiltration
call is disconnected, the incoming call is also disconnected.
2. An exfiltration call during an established incoming call at the victim phone: The
exfiltration call is not allowed, and the foreground established call continues.
3. An exfiltration call during an established outgoing call from the victim phone:
The exfiltration call is not allowed, and the foreground established call contin-
ues.
4. An attempt to make an outgoing call from victim phone during an exfiltration:
The exfiltration is disconnected and the dialer pops up on the victim phone
screen allowing the user to make the outgoing call.
5. The phone goes to sleeping mode during exfiltration: The exfiltration continues.
6. An exfiltration call when the phone is in the sleeping mode: The phone remains
in the sleeping mode, and the exfiltration is allowed to proceed.
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7. An exfiltration call during a non-phone applications such as web browsing and
camera: The exfiltration proceeds without any call indication, the application
also continues.
8. Opening of a non-phone application during an ongoing exfiltration: The appli-
cation starts and the exfiltration continues.
4.5 Discussion on the results
The results for Section 4.1 is explained by the settings of sound volumes to
match the different input and output audio devices. the volume of downlink voice
is much lower compared to the volume of uplink voice. This results from the fact
that the downlink voice volume is kept much lower to match the safety level of the
earpiece. The uplink voice comes from the microphone and the volume is set to
match the microphone which is higher than the volume set for the earpiece. Results
of Section 4.2 shows that when the recorded call is replayed at the adversary end, the
downlink voice in the recorded call is barely audible. This results from two factors.
First, the replay is given to the earpiece of the adversary phone so the voice volume
for both uplink and downlink channels in the recorded call is attenuated making the
downlink voice volume significantly lower than the uplink voice volume. Another
factor affecting the poor audibility is the fact that we have bypassed the Android
optimized mixer at the victim end, and used a mixer that is not fully optimized.
Section 4.4 shows that we have managed the states of exfiltrating call to keep it
covert. Most of the usual phone behavior have been tested to verify the covertness of
the exfiltration. As there are numerous possible interactions, more testings need to
be done for the verification of covertness in presence of complex interactions.
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CHAPTER 5
Countermeasures
The main purpose of this project is to expose a few potential attacks on mobile
phones that exploit the existing vulnerabilities of Android. Our potential attacks take
advantage of the fact that shared libraries and dex jar files can be built and installed on
any rooted mobile device once the device Android version is known. Unlike infecting
the device by making changes in SMALI code of a dex file that can be easily thwarted
by obfuscating the code, we argue that our approach poses significant challenges to
countermeasures. Any such countermeasure has to be evaluated carefully as it may
impact Android policy of open source and may not be justifiable from business point
of view. In this chapter, we try to evaluate possible countermeasures to mitigate the
risk of the potential attacks.
We have presented an attack that covertly records a call conversation other-
wise not permitted by Android. The key vector to this attack is the plaintext “au-
dio_policy.conf” file. We are easily able to include the voice call input device and its
profile in this file. A possible mitigation will be to encrypt this file. It will then also be
required that the decryption code is kept separate from the open source code. Hence
a vendor supplied proprietary code must be used for decryption. However Android
audio policy manager implements a default configuration built into the code when the
external file is not available on the device. Hence the adversary will easily be tempted
to remove the encrypted external file and then tamper the default configuration that
is available in the open source tree. Removal of default code altogether is not effective
as it can be easily reinstated.
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Mitigation of the covert replay attack is also difficult and must be investigated
for viability. The key attack vector here is the open source of tinyalsa that is used
for baseband device access. Use of a proprietary API for baseband access can be a
possible countermeasure. However, this decision falls in the space of Android open
source policy and the countermeasure can pose certain business impact. Another
approach may be to deploy in the target device a tamper detection mechanism for
the shared libraries. Use of cryptographic hash seems to be a viable option. The
cryptographic hash has to be kept in the pre-boot modules (such as initrd) to avoid
tampering of those hashes themselves. Implementation of such tamper detection
mechanism, however, should not come in the way of genuine experimentation or
install of upgrades on the device. Coming out with an effective mitigation approach
to protect a tampered shared library in Android calls for a research on its own.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and future work
Our project presents a proof of concept implementation for using a voice call as a
potential covert channel for data exfiltration. In order to achieve this, a call monitor is
inserted in the telephony stack for monitoring the incoming calls. When an incoming
call from a predetermined number is detected by the call monitor, it triggers either
the call recording or replay of an audio data depending on the incoming number.
The call recording is kept covert and the user does not get any clue of the ongoing
recording. The call monitor automatically connects the call for replay or exfiltration
of audio data. On the victim phone the replay is inaudible and there is no visual
indication of the call.
Our implementation breaks multiple security boundaries created by Android.
The recording of two-way call conversation during a voice call overcomes the recording
restriction of downlink voice stream posed by the Android audio policy manager. For
replaying an audio stream inaudibly over the voice call bypasses the restricted audio
path that prevents the flinger from sending the user audio stream directly to the
baseband device.
In our approach we have exploited Android dependency on shared libraries.
Shared libraries can be built easily in AOSP for any published Android version, and
can easily be inserted into a rooted mobile device. We have argued that our approach
presents difficult technical and business challenges to mitigate the proposed attacks.
Tampering detection in the shared library by using cryptographic hashes is not an
easily viable option as it will come in the way of doing genuine experimentation and
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upgrade on the device. Disassociating the vulnerable modules from AOSP and mak-
ing those modules as vendor proprietary may not be easily achievable due to business
reasons. Coming out with an effective mitigation of the potential attacks thus seeks
an independent research on its own.
Our current implementation is limited to only audio data exfiltration. The pub-
lished research [1, 8, 5] claim that a data can be audio modulated. Based on those
works, our work can be enhanced for application to a generic data exfiltration. The
data exfiltration built over voice call will break the distance limitations faced by the
published research.
Our implementation has paved the path for direct usage of tinyalsa for covert
replay of uplink voice streams over the voice call. We recommend to enhance this
mechanism to covertly capture the downlink incoming voice. It can be done by using
pcm_write call of tinyalsa. However, it requires additional research to keep the
downlink recording of voice call inaudible. Ability to covertly capture the downlink
voice stream will open up possibility of sending voice commands from a remote phone.
The captured voice commands then can be analysed to decipher the sent command
and action can be taken. This enhancement will offer a two-way covert links over
voice calls. A botnet like framework can evolve that can use covert links over voice
calls for sending and receiving voice and data commands. Attacks can be designed
over such framework that can spread faster and pervasively as the voice call has not
distance limitation and is available on all mobile devices without much censorship.
We conclude that the attack shown by our work has a far reaching influence on
design of future attacks that may have potentially much larger and disastrous impact
on mobile network. We seek out an immediate effective countermeasure to mitigate
the risk of such attacks.
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APPENDIX A
Eclipse Setup
A.1 Configuring SDK Path
To set SDK path, launch Eclipse and choose the following: Window -> Prefer-
ences -> Android -> SDK Location
Figure A.16: Setting SDK path in Eclipse
A.2 Enabling Build of System App
The Android plugin (ADT) in Eclipse enables Protected Permission in the Eclipse
Lint setting. This option has to be disabled by performing the following sequence:
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1. Select the project and right click on the project
2. Choose Build Path and then choose configure build path
3. A window opens as Figure A.17
4. Select Android Lint Preferences on the left menu
5. Scroll down to Protected Permissions on the right menu, select and disable this
option
Figure A.17: Enable System App build in Eclipse
A.3 ADT Hack: Allowing permission to use hidden API in Eclipse
1. Search for the ADT jar in the eclipse folder. Most likely this will be in
.eclipse/org.eclipse.platform_*_linux_gtk_x86_64/plugins folder The ADT
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jar file will be com.android.ide.eclipse.adt_*.jar
2. Save the original jar file and then extract this in some temporary folder
3. Locate AndroidClasspathContainerInitializer file under com/android/ide/e-
clipse/adt/internal/project folder
4. Edit and replace /com/android/internal/** to something like /com/android/in-
ternax/** that does not change the length of this string.
5. Create a jar file with the same name and copy it to the original ADT jar
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APPENDIX B
Building and Integrating Android Components
B.1 Build a shared library or jar file
From the root directory of AOSP:
1. . build/envsetup.sh
2. lunch
Pick up the required config from the above, hit Enter
3. make <modulename>
For example make "libmedia" will create libmedia.so
or
make "framework" will create framework.jar
Next, use adb to push the newly built files to their respective directory in the target
phone device. The following sequence shows how a libmedia.so file is pushed.
1. adb root
2. adb remount
3. adb push out/target/<pathname>/libmedia.so /system/lib/
4. adb reboot
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B.2 Manifest file to run the application inside Phone application
Figure B.18 illustrates the required entries in the Manifest.xml file for running
the application inside the internal Phone process.
Figure B.18: Entries in the in Manifest xml file to share the Phone process
B.3 How to sign using signApk
The application has to be exported from Eclipse using Unsigned Export. Prior
to executing the following steps, install signapk and zipalign.
1. right-click on project -> Android tools -> export Unsigned Application Package
2. choose a directory to store the unsigned apk
3. Use the following in sequence by suitably replacing the user supplied files shown
within <angular parenthesis>.
java -jar signapk.jar platform.x509.pem platform.pk8
<rSupport.apk> <rSupport_signed.apl>
zialign -fv 4 <rSupport_signed.apk> <final.apk>
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The Figure B.19 shows the screen capture of output.
Figure B.19: Signing the application
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